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FRAMING THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND BENEFITS OF
GEOENGINEERING: BALANCING THE HARD-TOIMAGINE AGAINST THE HARD-TO-MEASURE
Gareth Davies*
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades a number of scientists and writers have suggested techniques
which could be used to lower the temperature of the earth and thereby counteract manmade global warming.I Such techniques are commonly called geoengineering:
engineering the earth. 2
The proposals have attracted a range of reactions. Environmental groups have
generally been hostile, seeing geoengineering as a dangerous distraction from the only
real solution - reducing emissions. Geoengineering has been described as treating the
symptoms, not the cause. Scientific and academic writers have been less definite, with
the most common standpoint, almost a consensus, being that geoengineering may be
necessary as a last resort if dangerous climate tipping points approach, but that, because
of its risks, everything should be done to avoid this situation. 3 Emissions reduction,
almost all writers agree, is far preferable. Insofar as there is any enthusiasm for
geoengineering, it is largely based on pessimism that such reduction will actually occur
and a perception that geoengineering is a lesser evil than unfettered warming. Only a
very few writers take the more radical position that geoengineering may be a first choice,

* Department of Transnational Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, VU University Amsterdam.
1. See ROYAL SoC'Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY

(2009); Alan Carlin, Global Climate Change Control: Is There a Better Strategy Than Reducing Greenhouse
Gas Emission?, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1401, 1403-04 (2007); T.M.Lenton & N.E.Vaughan, The Radiative Forcing
Potentialof Diferent Climate Geoengineering Options, 9 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 5539, 554653 (2009); Stephen H. Schneider, Geoengineering: Could We or Should We Make It Work?, 366 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y A 3843, 3847 (2008), availableat http://www.rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/
content/366/1882/3843.full.pdf+html.
2. The term is usually traced back to Marehetti. Research Memorandum from Cesare Marchetti on
Geoengineering and the CO 2 Problem to the Int'l Inst. for Applied Sys. Analysis (Mar. 1976) (on file with the
University of Tulsa College of Law).
3. See ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at ix; Peter G. Brewer, Evaluating a Technological Fix for Climate,
104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 9915, 9916 (2007); Paul J. Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric
Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma?, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 211, 217 (2006);
Schneider, supra note 1, at 3855; John Virgoe, International Governance of a Possible Geoengineering
Intervention to Combat Climate Change, 95 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103, 106 (2008).
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not a second. 4 They argue that it is cheap, and need not be dangerous, and so permits
protection of the environment alongside the economic and development benefits of
carbon fuel use.
This paper challenges that "lesser evil" consensus.5 It may be that geoengineering
is undesirable, and only desirable as a last resort. But it may also be that it could make a
useful contribution to an optimal welfare outcome for humanity. One cannot take a firm
position on the basis of the current limited research. Thus it is not yet possible to argue
that geoengineering is part of the solution to climate change, but the widespread
assumption that it is relatively undesirable is without basis too.
That assumption matters because it influences the research and policy priority
accorded to geoengineering techniques. There are many voices suggesting that research
should proceed cautiously, that geoengineering should not yet be considered as a
possible policy option, and that public and intellectual engagement in general should be
avoided, or deferred. Partly this is because of the fear of deterring mitigation, mentioned
above, but there are also more complex political and ideological issues involved. In
offering a technical solution to a global problem, geoengineering would threaten
established ways of thinking about nature, sustainability, and social progress. This is
discussed below in part five.
The paper proceeds in several steps. Parts two and three describe and present the
various kinds of geoengineering techniques that have been proposed. Part four then
considers the kind of risk-benefit framework that is necessary to evaluate them. Part five
considers the kinds of factors that would need to be weighed within that framework:
environmental, economic, governance, and social. Part six concludes.
THE RANGE OF GEOENGINEERING OPTIONS
Any standpoint on the desirability of geoengineering depends, at least to some
extent, on the type of geoengineering under consideration. The range of proposals is
considerable, and the possible risks and benefits vary too. Some are apparently safe but
seem on the basis of research so far to be expensive and ineffective. Others are argued to
be cheap and effective but bring very considerable, and very uncertain, risks.6
The techniques proposed can be broadly divided into two groups, following the
practice adopted by the Royal Society in its very comprehensive 2009 report
Geoengineering the Climate.7 The first proposals, comprising the first group, aim at
4. See, e.g., David W. Keith, Engineering the Planet, in CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE AND POLICY 494,494
(Stephen Schneider et al. eds., 2010); WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE
OPTIONS ON GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES 78-79 (2008); WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING
THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 126-32 (2000); Deepak Lal, Eco-Fundamentalism, 71
INT'L AFF. 515, 520 (1995); Edward Teller et al., Active Climate Stabilization: Practical Physics-Based
Approaches to Prevention of Climate Change, LAWRENCE LivERMORE NAT'L LABORATORY, Apr. 18, 2002, at
1, 4, availableat http://www.osti.gov/accomplishments/documents/fullText/ACCO233.pdf.
5. The phrase is taken from Stephen M. Gardiner, Is "Arming the Future" with GeoengineeringReally the
Lesser Evil?, in CLIMATE ETHICS 284, 284 (Stephen M. Gardiner et al. eds., 2010). See also STUART
HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND PESSIMISM 16 (1972); Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical
1981, at 33, 34, available at
Jan./Feb.
Critique, AEl J. ON Gov'T & SoC'Y REG.,
http://fiesta.bren.ucsb.edu/-costello/courses/ESM204/ESM204_2007/Readings/CBAEthicalCritique.pdf.

6. See ROYAL Soc'Y, supra note 1, at 6.
7.

Id. at 1.
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capturing carbon from the atmosphere and have been named Carbon Dioxide Removal
("CDR") techniques. These include planting lots of trees, creating artificial trees which
absorb C0 2, putting iron in the oceans to stimulate CO 2 uptake by algae, and fitting CO 2
absorbers to power stations. As can be seen, many of these techniques are not very scary.
In general, it is hard to imagine that their climatic effects will be disastrous, since they
aim merely to undo what mankind is doing by emitting CO 2. Side effects are sometimes
a cause for concern, as is the case with iron fertilization of the seas, but for the majority
of the techniques, which simply absorb CO 2 by one means or another, this is generally
regarded as a non-issue - although whether that is entirely supported by evidence will
be returned to below.
In most cases, therefore, criticism of CDR methods focuses on cost, effectiveness,
and whether they amount to a distraction from the important task of emissions reduction.
The particular strength of most CDR measures is that they promise to return the
atmosphere to what it was, with all the associated images of naturalness, conservation,
and safety. The particular weakness of CDR measures is that most research suggests that
8
they would require very heavy investment for relatively low returns. Realistically, it
would not be possible to put up enough natural or artificial trees to deal with all the CO 2
we emit, and recent research on ocean fertilization has been disappointing too.9 At best,
CDR techniques may be used alongside emissions reductions as part of an overall
package, but even then critics point out the relatively high costs which CDR techniques
seem, on the basis of current research, to involve.
The other major group of proposals aims to cool the earth by increasing its albedo
- the degree to which it reflects sunlight. These Solar Radiation Management ("SRM")
techniques ignore the amount of CO 2 in the atmosphere and focus exclusively on
reflecting away heat. In general, it appears that an increase of a few percent in the
amount of sunlight reflected, rather than absorbed, would reduce global temperature by
several degrees. 1 It appears, moreover, that there are various ways in which such an
albedo increase could be produced. 12 Some of these ways have a slightly sci-fi aura to
them, such as proposals to place billions of tiny mirrors in space between the earth and
the sun.
However, there are two which stand out for being apparently practical and
technologically straightforward. One of these is an increase in the reflectivity of cloud
cover. It has been argued that, at a cost of merely billions, or at most tens of billions, per
year, a fleet of around 1500 wind-powered ships could spray sea water in the air and the
result would be a slight change in the composition of clouds, with the result that they
would reflect enough extra light to entirely undo man-made global temperature
increase.13 This is a fairly dramatic claim, since it promises to end global warming in a

8. Id. at 21.
9. Id. at 17; Lenton & Vaughan, supra note 1, at 5540.
10. Cf T.M.L. Wigley, A Combined Mitigation/GeoengineeringApproach to Climate Stabilization, 314
SCIENCE 452 (2006).
11.

ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 24.

12. Id. at 25.
13. Id. at 27; John Latham et al., Global Temperature Stabilization Via ControlledAlbedo Enhancement of
Low-Level Maritime Clouds, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y A 3969, 3970 (2008), available at
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simple and cheap way. However, there have been doubts about the effectiveness of the
technique,14 and there is not yet any scientific consensus regarding the point, with the
result that cloud albedo enhancement has, in recent years, taken second place in the
pantheon of proposals. The current poster child is, rather, the insertion of sulphur
particles into the stratosphere. 15 This high-flying powder would then reflect sufficient
sunlight to compensate for the warming effects of the CO 2 in the atmosphere below.
This idea was discussed influentially in 2006 by the Nobel Prize winner, Paul
Crutzen, and it appears that a sufficient amount of sulphur to return the global
temperature to its pre-global-warming state could be inserted by a number of simple and
cheap techniques.16 Perhaps most strikingly, it has been suggested that simply adding a
bit of sulphur to jet fuel - making it a bit dirtier - could combat global warming, an
idea which is both poetic and ironic, if not widely accepted. Nevertheless, it does seem
relatively accepted that the sulphur could be delivered and maintained without too much
difficulty; for example, by fitting ordinary jet aircraft with appropriate tanks. The Royal
Society adopted Robock's calculation that nine (yes nine!) jet aircraft could deliver
sufficient sulphur to cease global temperature rise. (Robock suggests using military
refueling craft because of their tank capacity.) 18
The reasons why sulphur in the stratosphere is becoming the geoengineering
technique of choice among aficionados are several. First, it appears to be cheap. There is
broad consensus that the cost of such addition would be in the order of billions or tens of
billions of dollars or euros per year. 19 To put this cost in perspective, it is suggested that,
for between one and thirty dollars per person in the developed world, the entire warming
effects of CO 2 could be eliminated. This has been understandably described as
"incredible" and would cost less, by an order of magnitude, than many other techniques,
or than the several hundreds of billions per year which have been (controversially)
attributed to emissions reduction. 20 There are a number of question marks surrounding
both the costs and the comparison with emissions reduction, which are returned to below,

http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/366/1882/3969.full; Stephen Salter et al., Sea-Going Hardware
for the Cloud Albedo Method of Reversing Global Warming, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y A 3989,
3990 (2008), availableat http://www.rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/-content/366/1882/3989.full.pdf+html.
14.
15.

ROYAL Soc'Y, supra note 1, at 28; Lenton & Vaughan, supranote 1, at 5548.
Brewer, supra note 3, at 9915; Lenton & Vaughan, supra note 1, at 5548.

16. Crutzen, supra note 3, at 212; Lenton & Vaughan, supra note 1, at 5556; Wigley, supra note 10.
17. PANEL ON POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE
WARMING: MITIGATION, ADAPTATION, AND THE SCIENCE BASE 453 (1992) [hereinafter PANEL].
18. ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 32. See also Alan Robock et al., Benefits, Risks, and Costs of
Stratospheric Geoengineering, 36 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L19703 (2009). C.f Philip J. Rasch et al., An

Overview of Geoengineering of Climate Using Stratospheric Sulphate Aerosols, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL SOC'Y A 4007 (2008).
19. PANEL, supra note 17, at 453; ROYAL SoC'Y, supra note 1, at 3; Dan Bradley, Geoengineering
Research, POSTNOTE, Mar. 2009, at 1, 3; Crutzen, supra note 3, at 32; Keith, supra note 4, at 495-96; Lenton &
Vaughan, supra note 1, at 5555; Robock et al., supranote 18, at 2-4.

20. Scott Barrett, The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering, 39 ENVTL. RESOURCE ECON. 45 (2008),
available at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/bin/w/p/Geoengineering.pdf. See also NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REvIEW 267 (2007). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
estimates mitigation costs far lower, at around fifty billion dollars per year (0.12% of global GDP), little more
than the geoengineering estimates. Terry Barker & Igor Bashmakov, Mitigation from a Cross-Sectoral
Perspective, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 621-87 (Bert Metz et al. eds.,
2007).
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but the ballpark cost estimates have broad enough support, and are so strikingly cheap,
that SRM is pushed straight into the limelight and becomes seductive for any policy
maker concerned about economics.21 Second, sulphur techniques are relatively familiar
because they correspond quite closely to what happens when volcanos erupt.22 It is well
known that major eruptions cause temporary decreases in global temperature as a result
of the sulphurous particles they pump into the upper atmosphere; so sulphur techniques
can be given an aura of naturalness, even safety, by presenting them as comparable to
volcanos.23 Such techniques just add a bit more to the stratosphere of the same substance
that goes there naturally. This is, perhaps, less alarming than the more radical or
innovative SRM techniques and, in some eyes, less risky. 24 Third, there appears to be a
fairly broad agreement that sulphur techniques would actually work - partly based on
that volcano experience. 2 5 Thus it can be argued that there is no false promise being
made here, but a concrete, practical, and affordable proposal.
However, the particular weakness of SRMs in general, including sulphur
techniques, is that they may have nasty, unexpected, or even catastrophic side effects perhaps reducing precipitation, changing monsoon circulation, causing rainforest
contraction, or changing ocean currents such as the El Nino.26 In particular, there may be
local and regional variations in the effects so that global climate improvement may mask
local environmental disaster, such as desertification or changes in wildlife or plant
27
populations which may impact agriculture and access to food. Because SRM does not
reduce the amount of CO 2 in the atmosphere, it also does not solve the nontemperature
problems that this creates, notably acidification of the oceans.28 In general, SRM creates
a new atmospheric situation, with high C02 but relatively low temperature, with whoknows-what consequences. It can be argued that global warming itself shows that we
should not play such experimental atmospheric games.
In the midst of such a sea of proposals, and arguments and counterarguments, the
challenge is to decide how to assess them rationally. Geoengineering promises too much
to be dismissed out of hand, but raises too many risks to be casually embraced. Some
form of balancing of risks and benefits is inevitable. The particular challenges for this
balancing are twofold. First, there are many uncertainties involved, making it difficult to
quantify or even determine what is to be balanced. Second, there are very different issues
and interests at stake, from the narrowly environmental to the social and economic.
Comparing these may seem like comparing apples and pears. Nevertheless, the following
sections suggest that a risk-benefit analysis is both possible and inevitable.

21. See infra pp. 118-20.
22. Wigley, supra note 10, at 452-53.
23. Crutzen, supranote 3, at 212.
24. Wigley, supra note 10, at 452-53.
25. See supranotes 16-18 and accompanying text.
26. ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 36; Bradley, supra note 19, at 4; Brewer, supra note 3, at 9915; Alan
Robock et al., A Testfor Geoengineering, 327 SCIENCE 530, 530 (2010); David G. Victor, On the Regulation of
Geoengineering,24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 322, 323 (2008).
27. See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
28. Alan Robock, 20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be a Bad Idea, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
May/June 2008, at 14, 15; Wigley, supra note 10, at 452-53.
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RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF GEOENGINEERING
Where complex policy choices have to be made it is commonplace to engage in
cost-benefit analysis. The costs and benefits associated with each possible choice are
established, and then typically they are quantified, usually in financial terms. This
enables them to be compared, so that it can be seen which choice is the most
advantageous.
Where the outcomes of particular choices are uncertain a technique called riskbenefit analysis is commonly used. 29 This is similar, except that for each possible cost
and benefit a risk is assigned, indicating how likely that outcome is. In straightforward
cases the quantified value of the cost or benefit is then multiplied by the chance that the
outcome will occur, and the results of this can be added up to indicate the net advantage
or disadvantage of the course of action. 30
It has been argued that such risk-benefit analysis is not appropriate for issues like
geoengineering, which involve both indeterminacy and severe risks. 3 1 First, there are too
many "unknown unknowns." Climate engineering is likely to cause at least some
problems which are completely unexpected and so cannot be identified a priori.We do
not then possess all the information necessary for such an analysis.32 Second, even
where we have some idea of the kinds of risks in issue, the state of scientific knowledge
is such that we cannot assign probabilities with any precision or accuracy. Assignment
would be essentially arbitrary. This makes meaningful quantification of costs and
benefits and their comparison impossible. 33 Third, it is sometimes argued that some
outcomes are so unspeakably awful that they should not even be accepted as
possibilities. 34 They should be excluded in advance, rather than costed and weighed.
This argument is often used where human life is concerned: should one person be killed
if it would save ten elsewhere? A mere mathematics of life is repugnant to many.
Similarly, the risk of catastrophic climate side effects, with inevitably devastating social,
human, and moral consequences, is not something to be coolly quantified, but to be
prohibited, it may be claimed. 35
None of these arguments are entirely convincing. While it is true that the risks of
geoengineering cannot be accurately assessed, or even identified, it may be that this is
equally true of not geoengineering. In that case the unknown variables recur on both
sides of the equation and may be eliminated. If there is no reason to think that more
unknown unknowns are associated with geoengineering than with continued CO 2
emission, or that the inaccuracy of risk assessment is greater on one side than on the
other, then the two can be compared on the basis of the remaining factors. Thus the
29. RICHARD WILSON & EDMUND A.C. CROUCH, RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 8 (2d ed. 2001).
30. Andreas Klinke & Ortwin Renn, A New Approach to Risk Evaluation and Management: Risk-Based,
Precaution-Based,andDiscourse-BasedStrategies, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 1071, 1076 (2002).
31. Id.at1072.
32. H. Damon Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Transient Climate-Carbon Simulations of Planetary
Geoengineering,104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 9949, 9952 (2007); H. Damon Matthews & Sarah E. Turner, Of
Mongooses and Mitigation: EcologicalAnalogues to Geoengineering, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Oct.-Dec. 2009,
at 1, 7; Robock et al., supranote 26, at 531; Victor, supra note 26, at 329.
33. Klinke & Renn, supra note 30, at 1073-74.
34. HAMPSHIRE, supranote 5, at 16-18; Gardiner, supra note 5, at 299-300; Kelman, supra note 5, at 33.
35. Gardiner, supra note 5, at 16-18.
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extent to which inaccuracy, indeterminacy, and uncertainty are problems for a riskbenefit analysis depends on what geoengineering is to be compared with, the subject of
discussion below.
Something similar is true of the catastrophic side-effects argument. If this means
that SRM geoengineering cannot even be considered, then it may also mean that CO 2
emission also cannot be considered. It therefore leads quickly and simply to the
conclusion that the only path legitimately open to consideration is CO 2 reduction
combined with nonthreatening CDR techniques. This is understandable, but the question
is whether it is useful. If, as a matter of fact, the reality may diverge from this ideal, it is
suggested that policy makers should have some way of considering the pros and cons of
the various diverging paths.
The argument against risk-benefit analysis of geoengineering, or of climate change
in general, is fundamentally a fear of over-quantification and over-simplification. The
temptation in cost-benefit and risk-benefit analysis is to overvalue factors which are easy
to identify and measure, and so which tend to be concrete, economic, and immediate, and
to undervalue factors which may be subtle, hard to measure, or long term. Social, human,
and ethical effects, and effects which are complex, are easy to ignore or push aside in the
desire to produce hard results.
However, this is not inherent in the balancing process. Risk-benefit analysis may
be done in an amateurish and clunky way, but it can also be done in a more complete and
sophisticated way. Fear of a simplistic process is not a convincing argument against
attempts to weigh risks and benefits more intelligently.
Nor does such weighing rely on all factors being quantified. It may be hard to say
how we can compare an apparently nonquantifiable risk - the chance that society
becomes harder and more exploitative - against a simpler one - the chance of reduced
rainfall in location X. Yet we engage in such balancing processes every day when we
purchase things which we think will bring us pleasure. The economists' idea of revealed
preferences enables us to put a value on our pleasures and sufferings, by asking how
much we would pay to avoid or achieve certain results.36 The fact that assessing the risks
and benefits of geoengineering, or alternative policy paths, will result in a mix of
quantified and nonquantified factors does not exclude the possibility of decision making
based on weighing options.
Indeed, the fundamental argument in favour of risk-benefit analysis in this context
is that it is the only nonarbitrary form of decision making. Whenever choices are to be
made there is no alternative than to weigh the pros and cons. A taboo on a given outcome
is simply an extremely high (infinite) quantification of a certain cost. There is no riskbenefit analysis problem with this, although such weightings should be assigned with
care to ensure that they represent an authentically strong preference, rather than a
symbolic gesture or an aversion to engaging with reality. An a prioridecision to exclude
geoengineering as a policy option, or even to stop researching it, is merely an ad hoc
risk-benefit analysis in which the conclusion has been quickly reached by assuming that

36. Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15 ECONOMICA 243, 243
(1948); P. A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA 61, 62-71
(1938).
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nothing could counterbalance some of the apparent costs. That may ultimately be true,
but it will be suggested below that upon careful analysis of the alternatives, on the basis
of current science, it is not self-evident.
Excluding a thorough risk-benefit analysis on the basis of the conclusions of an ad
hoc balancing process is therefore difficult to justify. The only serious argument for
doing so is that the risk-benefit analysis process is itself dangerous because it will tend to
be done so badly that it will lead to wrongful results: We shouldn't think any more about
this because we'll only get ourselves in a muddle. That argument is not ridiculous. The
fear that risk-benefit analysis will be distorted by technocrats and number crunchers into
a simplistic process is not without foundation, as the significant scholarship on the
dangers of over-technocracy tells us. 37 However, it seems unlikely that the opponents of
risk-benefit analysis are sufficiently powerful to prevent others from engaging in it.
Geoengineering will, despite protests, be considered and its risks and benefits weighed.
In that case, it is suggested, let us try and do the process well.
THE PROCESS OF RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The essence of risk-benefit analysis is that it assists in choosing between
alternatives. The costs and benefits of a policy pathway can only be meaningfully
assessed by comparison with some alternative scenario. There is thus no sense in
applying risk-benefit analysis to geoengineering techniques alone. It must also be applied
to other possible scenarios, in order to see which are preferable. The first step is therefore
to decide on the alternatives - the policy choices or paths with which geoengineering
must be compared.
A standard risk-benefit approach is to consider the most probable or plausible
alternative path only.38 This enables one-on-one comparison and makes the process
39
easier. However, it is clearly an approximation, since other possible paths are ignored.
The issues involved here are too important to permit such a rough-and-ready approach.
Thus as well as assessing the chances of certain events given a certain policy path, we
also need to assess the chances of those paths.
A simple approach would be to consider three paths:
(1) SRM geoengineering;
(2) CO 2 emission reduction, through some combination of reduced use and
CDR techniques; and
(3) Continued CO 2 emissions at current, near current, or even greater levels.
These three options correspond broadly to (1) a choice for active geoengineering,
(2) a safe and responsible move to a low-emissions world, and (3) a failure to engage
37. E.g., Denis Smith & Steve Tombs, Of Course It's Safe, Trust Me!, in RISK MANAGEMENT AND SOCIETY
1, 8-9 (Eve Coles et al. eds., 2000); Mihail Kritikos, TraditionalRisk Analysis and Releases of GMOs into the
European Union: Space for Non-Scientific Factors?, 44 EUR. L. REv. 405 (2009); Myanna Lahsen,
Technocracy, Democracy, and U.S. Climate Politics: The Need for Demarcations,30 SCI., TECH., & HUM.
VALUES 137, 143 (2005).

38. Sven Ove Hansson, Economic (Ir)Rationalityin Risk Analysis, 22 ECON. & PHIL. 231, 231-32 (2006).
39. Id. at 238.
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with the issue leading to business as usual and increased global warming.
Either one could compare path one with path two and then path one with path three
to produce independent estimates of the relative benefits of each path. Alternatively, one
could assign probabilities to paths two and three, use these to produce a compound costbenefit result for these two options, and then compare this with path one. This would
amount to comparing geoengineering with "not geoengineering." 40
Ultimately, one would hope for more complex models, in which intermediate paths
can be weighed and considered, but the sketch above gives an idea of the kind of
comparisons which have to be made. What is immediately apparent is that the
desirability of geoengineering is highly dependent upon the relative chances of paths two
and three. 4 1 If it were known that, if it came to the brink, the world would collectively
act to reduce CO 2 to safe levels, this would make geoengineering far less attractive. If it
were known that there would be a collective policy failure until it was too late,
geoengineering would become correspondingly more attractive. As well as the scientific
and climatic factors, one of the most important areas for research is therefore political.
There is an urgent need for consideration of the likely global governance outcomes and
likely CO 2 emissions if SRM is excluded.
Such predictive political research is daunting at the best of times. What
complicates it in this context is reflexivity. A common argument against geoengineering
is that it distracts, or offers false hope, and therefore reduces the chance of emissions
reductions.42 Considering path one may therefore make path three more likely than path
two. The very fact of academic and policy engagement with the possibilities of path one
may tilt the balance of the alternative scenarios in favour of path three, making path one
more desirable. Geoengineering discussion may therefore be self-fulfilling. By contrast,
excluding geoengineering in advance would make states more likely to agree to
reductions and to follow path two. Hence, it is argued, the interest in the best possible
solution, path two, is served by refusing to consider geoengineering right now.
Despite this not-implausible argument, it is unlikely to be sufficient to stifle
discussion. 4 3 Thus, if the aim is to produce real-world analysis, it is probably necessary
to consider the chances of paths two and three in a world in which path one is a
possibility on the table, albeit that this may seem like "cheating" to geoengineering
opponents. The "moral hazard" argument against geoengineering, or even
geoengineering research, as it is often called, is likely to be simply beside the point.
In any case, the argument is presumptuous. By resisting exploration of climate
management on the basis that it may inhibit emissions reduction, it assumes that the
latter is preferable to the former, but this is one of the questions which the currently
available evidence does not in fact decide. In particular, it seems far from impossible that
policy packages will ultimately include a mix of reduced emissions, climate intervention,

40. Id.
41. Crutzen, supranote 3, at 216-17.
42. David R. Morrow et al., Toward Ethical Norms and Institutions for Climate Engineering Research,
ENVTL. RES. LETTERs, Oct.-Dec. 2009, at 1, 3; Robock, supra note 28, at 18; Stephen H. Schneider, Earth
Systems: Engineering and Management, 409 NATURE 417, 417-18 (2001); Virgoe, supra note 3, at 104.
43. Edward A. Parson, Reflections on Air Capture: The Political Economy of Active Intervention in the
Global Environment, 74 CLIMATIC CHANGE 5, 13 (2006).
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and acceptance of warming. One does not need to believe that geoengineering may be a
complete solution, or a best option, to believe that it may be a desirable element of a
realistically achievable total policy package.
In addition, the moral hazard argument raises one very real danger: that if global
warming reaches a point where geoengineering clearly is desirable the political and
research base will not be there. Such things take time. It is not particularly precautionary
to defer thinking about emergency measures until the emergency is here.
A further complicating factor is that the nature of the reflexivity between the
various paths is not uncontested. It has been argued that the possibility of geoengineering
actually makes emissions reductions more likely. Because the cheap and easy SRM
techniques could be done unilaterally but might have unpleasant side effects, if a single
state were to consider using SRM this might be perceived by others as threatening and
actually motivate them to agree to more conservative emissions reductions or CDR
techniques.44 Global discussion of path one might frighten everybody into path two.
Alternatively, it has also been argued that the use or possibility of geoengineering might
galvanize the public or policy makers and motivate them to mitigate emissions. 4 5 There
really is an urgent need for more research on whether these arguments work.
The process described above provides a framework within which costs, risks, and
benefits can be compared. The next step is then to clarify and actually weigh those costs,
risks, and benefits. This is where research is still at a relatively early stage, and it is the
progress of that research which will make rational, evidence-based decision making
possible. However, a qualitative survey of the kinds of pros and cons which may be
involved is possible, and that is the aim of the following section. Such a survey provides
more clarity about the nature of the balancing involved and the problems it may raise.
THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF GEOENGINEERING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
This part of the article outlines the factors needing to be considered in making a
risk-benefit analysis of geoengineering and its alternatives. It focuses on sulphur-based
SRM measures, since these are currently attracting particular attention for their apparent
low costs and high effectiveness. The costs, risks, and benefits associated with
geoengineering and its alternatives are grouped into four types: environmental factors,
economic factors, governance factors, and social factors.
Environmental Consequences
Sulphur-based or particulate-based SRM is likely to lower temperature effectively,
but, as was discussed above, it will either not solve, or will introduce, other problems. 46
First, it does nothing about the acidification of the oceans which results from raised CO 2
levels and which may harm ocean life. 4 7 There are suggestions that it may be possible to

44. Sarah Polborn & Felix Tintelnot, How GeoengineeringMay Encourage Carbon Dioxide Abatement 1,
2 (Ctr. for Research on Int'l Fin. & Energy Security, Working Paper, 2009) available at
http://crifes.psu.edu/papers/polbompaper.pdf.
45. ROYAL Soc'y, supra note 1, at 43; Matthews & Turner, supra note 32, at 5.
46. See supra text accompanying note 26.
47. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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address this acidification by other means, but research is not at a stage offering any
certainty. 4 8 Second, SRM may have a negative effect on the ozone layer, leading to
ozone depletion and subsequent problems for human, animal, and plant life. 49 As with
acidification, there are suggestions that this problem may be manageable, but the current
research provides no certainty. 50 Third, SRM promises considerable regional variations
in its effects. Reduced global temperature averages may conceal not just local
temperature differences but fail to mention other local climatic effects, notably reduced
precipitation. The world, or at least many parts of it, might become cooler and drier,
partly as a result of reduced evaporation as a consequence of reduced sunlight reaching
the surface of the planet. 5 1 This could of course impact agriculture, biodiversity, and
lifestyle, as well as leading to migration and water conflicts of varying scales and
severities.52
All of these risks are significant, but seem assessable and not determinative. There
may be ways of managing them, and none are of an order that would exclude
consideration of SRM or further research. One would expect that in the coming years it
would be possible to take a position with reasonable confidence on how serious they are
and use this alongside the cooling effects of SRM and its cost to weigh its desirability.
However, other aspects of SRM are commonly regarded as problematic. One is
that it has to be continuously maintained, whether it is by ongoing cloud enhancement or
ongoing insertion of sulphur into the stratosphere.53 If SRM was stopped the temperature
could "rebound," given that high CO 2 levels would be present, resulting in an extremely
fast increase in temperature. 54 Not only would the good work of cooling be undone but
the speed of the change could itself be destabilizing for ecosystems or climate systems so
that the resulting warming could be even more catastrophic than if it had occurred more
slowly. 55 An SRM approach therefore requires stable governance and a long-term
commitment, and/or a well-thought-through exit strategy, such as gradually lowering
56
CO 2 to the point where SRM can be gradually reduced. The risk of rebound is clearly
one to be taken seriously, but it seems unlikely that states, having established an SRM
system, would behave suicidally and suddenly walk away from it. Even in the event that
some states did, the relative cheapness and ease of SRM would mean that other states
could maintain the process. Therefore, it seems that the risk raised here is not so much of
rebound actually occurring but of states being trapped in an ongoing governance process.
The specter is raised of a governance cost. It is considered below whether forcing states
to engage in long-term, multilateral environmental governance is really such a negative
effect. 57

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

ROYAL SOC'Y, supranote 1, at 36; Lenton & Vaughan, supra note 1, at 5556.
Crutzen, supra note 3, at 213-14.
ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 31.
Robock et al., supra note 26; Victor, supra note 26, at 326-28.
Robock et al., supra note 26; Victor, supra note 26, at 326-28.
Schneider, supranote 1, at 3857.
Matthews & Caldeira, supra note 32, at 9952.
Id.
ROYAL Soc'Y, supra note 1, at 56; Schneider, supra note 1, at 3857.
See infra pp. 120-22.
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Fear of governance is part of another, closely related, criticism of SRM: that it
sucks the globe into a never-ending chain of measures.58 It creates side effects which in
turn require management, and this management will no doubt create new side effects and
so on, until we are engaged in a sort of endless damage limitation exercise.
While plausible, it is suggested that the way to deal with this is just to try to
identify and quantify the specific problems and assess them. The presentation above
suggests that the total harm is greater than the sum of the parts, as if the fact of one
measure making others necessary and creating an ever-broadening environmental
management process is in itself a significant harm. There are certainly arguments to be
made about this (considered below), but it is far from obviously a good point, and the
approach taken is not that taken in other analogous, scientific circumstances.
Geoengineering is, for example, analogous to a drug in development which promises
effective treatment for some threatening disease but with the likelihood of unpleasant or
serious side effects. 59 Does the public then dismiss the drug or sneer at it? On the
contrary, the fact of a possibility of treatment is seen as exciting and hopeful, and new
research is hurriedly commissioned to see if the side effects can be managed or reduced.
In general, we accept that every solution brings new problems,and we seek to understand
and minimize these problems, and ultimately to make rational assessments of whether
the cure is in fact worse than the disease. There seems no reason to consider the chain of
consequences argument as a particularly persuasive downside to geoengineering, above
60
and beyond what those actual consequences may be.
The real, and more serious, fear underlying the chain of consequences argument is
that geoengineering will have unintended consequences. The single most powerful
argument against it is that we simply do not know what its consequences will be, and
some of them may be entirely unexpected and far worse than we had imagined. 61
Without this argument SRM would almost certainly enjoy far more support. However,
climate change itself gives us a hint of the scale of the harm that atmospheric meddling
can cause and provides for many a conclusive argument that geoengineering is far too
dangerous except as an alternative to imminent catastrophe.
It is, of course, hard to say anything definite about the scale or extent of unknown
risks. An interesting attempt has been made by Damon Matthews and Sarah Turner, who
have drawn a comparison that has been made with other areas where humankind has
intervened in complex biological systems with good intentions. 62 The authors conclude
that often the consequences were unexpected, complicated, and worse than anticipated
and that, despite a chain of remedial reactions, the well-intentioned initial measures did
end up making everything much worse. They concede that risk-assessment is more
sophisticated now than in the time of the interventions they consider, but nevertheless

58. James Lovelock, A Geophysicist's Thoughts on Geoengineering, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
SoC'Y 3883 (2008); Schneider, supranote 1, at 3857; Victor, supranote 26, at 328.
59. Victor, supra note 26, at 326-27 (comparing geoengineering with the "cocktail" of drugs used to
combat HIV infection).
60. Russell Powell et al., The Ethics of Geoengineering 3 (James Martin Geoengineering Ethics Working
Grp., Working Paper), available at http://www.practicalethicsnews.com/files/geoengineering-final.pdf.
61. Schneider, supra note 1, at 3855; Victor, supra note 26, at 328.
62. Matthews & Turner, supra note 32. See also Victor, supra note 26, at 328.
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conclude that there is evidence of a human tendency towards hubris - that when faced
with exciting and innovative solutions, people overestimate benefits and the chances of
success and underestimate risks and the chances of harm.63 Particularly where a severe
consequence has a relatively low probability we may tend to put it out of our minds. 64
We have a tendency to want to believe what is easy and convenient and to neglect
counter-evidence. Hence, even if the little we know about geoengineering and climate
may suggest positive outcomes, we should consider the larger picture of a species that
consistently overestimates its capacity to manage the environment and stay well away
from such a complex and vital system as the atmosphere. This is particularly so because
we are not talking about contained intervention in a defined area but about creating
global changes which have the capacity to cause global harm, potentially catastrophic. 65
We may not understand the climate well enough to predict all the outcomes of
geoengineering, but research into human behavior provides little reason not to expect
unpleasant surprises if we allow optimism, good intentions, and just a dash of scientific
understanding to be our policy guides.
This precautionary approach is thought provoking. It has pessimistic and
antiscientific undertones which make it no less valid but will determine the groups to
whom it appeals.66 However, it is less useful than first appears as a guide to action. The
reason is that all the arguments are equally true of not geoengineering. We may be a
hubristic species prone to leaping clumsily into the dark, but the real question facing us
is not whether to leap into darkness, but in which direction. All policy options take us
into the unknown. The perception that leaping in darkness is dangerous does not help us
here.
This is most obviously true of continued CO 2 emission via the use of carbon
fuels.67 Global warming also promises unexpected consequences of unknowable
severity. There is no reason at all to think that the consequences of SRM would be more
surprising or more serious. Thus if SRM and business as usual are being compared the
"unknown unknowns" argument appears on both sides of the equation and simply drops
away. It is, however frightening the prospect, a policy irrelevance at most and may
actually support SRM, since it is commonly felt that this would result in more
predictable and safer climate outcomes than warming.
Where the precautionary argument appears to carry weight is if the alternative to
SRM is reduced emissions. A precondition for dismissing geoengineering as dangerous
on the basis of unintended consequences is therefore sufficient confidence that emissions
will be reduced. Otherwise we simply trade the chance of side effects in a cool world for
side effects in a hot world. Where geoengineering is dismissed in public discourse as too
dangerous this is often from the perspective that emissions reduction "must" occur.
However, mature policy entails recognising that sometimes what "must" happen does
See BENT FLYVBJERG ET AL., MEGAPROJECTS AND RISK: AN ANATOMY OF AMBITION (2003).
See Hansson, supra note 38, at 232.
Matthews & Turner, supra note 32, at 7.
See generally MIKE HULME, WHY WE DISAGREE ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE: UNDERSTANDING
CONTROVERSY, INACTION AND OPPORTUNITY (2009); Adam Corner & Nick Pidgeon, Geoengineering the
Climate: The Social and EthicalImplications, 52 ENv'T 24 (2010).
67. Powell et al., supra note 60, at 3.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2010

13

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 46 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 2
274

TULSA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46:261

not. Blind adherence to the impossibility of anything other than emissions reductions
does not represent environmental commitment so much as ideological commitment; it
indicates a readiness to sacrifice actual environmental interests to policy purity. To coin
a clichd: the best is the enemy of the good.
There is a striking irony here. Dismissing geoengineering as a dangerous gamble is
itself gambling that, if geoengineering is dismissed, emissions reduction will in fact
prevail. Since the consequences of losing that gamble are in fact just as bad, probably
worse, than the consequences of geoengineering, it is hard to see how research and
policy engagement with geoengineering can be in any sense more irresponsible than
avoiding it.
Put in a rather crude and simplified way: if geoengineering is declared taboo, we
have a chance of catastrophe (global warming C(G Wt)) and a chance of safety (emissions
reduction S(ERt)). If geoengineering is on the table as an option, we have two chances of
catastrophe (geoengineering goes wrong C(G), or global warming C(GW)) and two
chances of safety (emissions reduction S(ER), or geoengineering actually works without
disaster S(G)). For a taboo on geoengineering to be advantageous, from this perspective,
it would have to reduce the chance of emissions reduction by more than the chance that
geoengineering would work. That is to say S(ER) + S(G) < S(ERt). Such a standpoint
seems speculative in the extreme for the reasons discussed earlier. 6 8 More sociological
research might support this position, but it might also demolish it; for example, if it
appears that the threat of geoengineering in fact motivates emissions reduction.
In any case, there may be (unknown) risks in CO 2 reduction, counterintuitive
though this is. Is it as unequivocally harmless as is assumed? Like raising CO 2 levels or
adding sulphur particles, reducing CO 2 levels also represents an active intervention in the
atmosphere. Indeed, given that CO 2 has been climbing for some time, one could argue
that even stabilizing CO 2 levels represents an active intervention against the background
status quo. In fact, that very idea of "status quo" has been lost sight of some time ago,
and all options, including reduction in CO 2 emissions, represent some kind of climate
manipulation.69 On this abstract level there is no type-difference between emitting less
C0 2, emitting more, or adding sulphur. The difference is between the risks associated
with each kind of climate engineering, and the assumption is that emitting less is by far
the safest, even riskless.
There is no intention here to claim that this view is wrong but merely to ask
whether it is entirely supported by current evidence. On the one hand, it is certainly the
case that the atmosphere seems to have enjoyed considerable stability before we began
overfilling it with C0 2, which would suggest that if we can return to that situation the
climatic stability may return too. However, we cannot entirely return to that situation.
The earth has changed - fewer forests, fewer fish, more urban area, other man-made
chemicals in the atmosphere - and will continue to change under the influence of
growing and developing population. Climate is not purely a product of CO 2 levels but of

68. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
69. Gareth Davies, Law and Policy Issues of UnilateralGeoengineering,in 2 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE
EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 628 (H616ne Ruiz Fabri et al. eds., 2010); Parson, supra note 43,
at 9.
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the interaction of various factors, so that returning CO 2 to previous levels without
returning the physical global environment to that previous situation in fact represents a
new environmental scenario. It is possible to make the same claims about unknown risks
as for geoengineering.
The disturbing fact is that CO 2 reduction is also taking us into the unknown. It may
cool effectively, but other aspects of climate, from precipitation to wind and ocean
current patterns, might not be the same post-cooling, either because of the changed earth
or because the changes in climate we have already experienced are not simply reversible;
there are many complex systems whereby reversing one's steps does not take one back to
the beginning.
Nevertheless, it does seem overwhelmingly likely on the basis of knowledge so far
that reducing CO 2 would be a more predictable and safer pathway than SRM. At least,
this is the only conclusion which can be drawn by the nonscientist from the existing
scholarship. However, applying the arguments about complexity and tipping points
which scholarship musters against CO 2 emission to its reduction suggests that the
difference is less absolute than may sometimes be claimed. That suggests we should
investigate it carefully. The comparison between SRM and CO 2 reduction merits
thorough research.
Indeed, the author admits to the same fear of sounding anti-CO 2 reduction which
manifestly infects much writing about climate change and geoengineering in particular.
Many articles consist of careful scientific discussion of geoengineering followed by
anxious assertions that of course CO 2 reduction is best, while this is not in fact the
unambiguous conclusion of the presented research. No one wants to seem to be on the
side of the nutcases, and those who believe in global warming have an understandable
fear of dividing their camp and becoming vulnerable to the skeptics or the forces of
darkness. Yet, summoning up my courage, if one were to think rigorously about this
issue, one should be skeptical of CO 2 reduction as an unproblematic pathway to restoring
past climatic conditions.
The theory of second best, familiar to economists, describes a commonsensical but
nevertheless true and important rule: that the action which achieves the best result under
perfect circumstances may not be the one which achieves the best result under imperfect
circumstances. 70 Indeed, where systems are complex even a slight change or
imperfection in background circumstances may dramatically change the effects which
different kinds of actions achieve. The optimal approach may become a disastrous
approach as a result of apparently minor changes in circumstances. Of course, it may not.
The law of second best does not say that every circumstantial change does bring
chaos to our ideas of best practice, just that it may. The only answer is to investigate
carefully. However, given that it is such a well-known phenomenon of complex systems
that small changes can have large effects, it would be rather amateur to assume that CO 2
reduction will simply take the climate back to where it was and to assume that it cannot
have dramatically unexpected results. The risks of CO 2 reduction need to be assessed,
and then we need to think whether we should also be concerned about unknown risks.
70. R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory ofSecondBest, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11, 11-32
(1956), reprintedin READINGS INSOCIAL WELFARE: THEORY AND POLICY 47 (Robert E. Kuenne ed., 2000).
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This, of course, is an impossible question, but the best we can do is estimate whether we
understand the system as a whole; and if investigating the effects of CO 2 reduction
reveals that we do not, then we may have to stop regarding this approach as
precautionary and view it as just another CDR geoengineering technique. A survey of the
literature suggests that the safe and precautionary nature of CO 2 reduction is more often
taken for granted than it is shown to be the case.
Economic consequences
The upfront costs of sulphur-based SRM have been put at somewhere in the order
of tens of billions of dollars per year, as discussed above. 7 1 These do not seem
particularly speculative. There are concrete ideas of how sulphur insertion can be
achieved, and, as a result, the general order of magnitude seems to enjoy a reasonable
consensus. However, added to this cost should of course be the costs of mitigating side
effects, which currently are a great unknown and about which it should be commented
that the evidence shows a human tendency to underestimate the costs of ambitious and
exciting projects.72 A number of authors are deeply skeptical of the headline figures for
SRM, considering them as little more than "startup costs." 73 It is the price tag on the
consequences that we really need to see. Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that these
consequences can be managed and priced. Early research provides some hope that
acidification of the oceans and ozone reduction can be combated,74 and it is far from
inconceivable that a climate-preserving SRM package would be relatively affordable. 75
The costs of conventional mitigation are harder to assess. The most authoritative
estimate so far, the Stem report, estimated something between four hundred billion and a
trillion dollars per year. 76 In contrast, the International Panel on Climate Change appears
to prefer a lower figure of around fifty billion dollars per year, but this does not appear to
be the price of full mitigation and does not enjoy the same support (yet?) as the Stem
figure. 77 Other research supports the lower estimates however, partly on the grounds that
mitigation would entail the development of new technologies, particularly in energy
generation, which would have positive economic and social spin-offs.78 A seductive and
understandable view is to see conventional mitigation not so much as a cost but as a
catalyst for transition to a cleaner, more energy-abundant, and ultimately better-off
planet.
However, similar arguments can be made about geoengineering. Embracing
climate management would entail not only new science and technology but new
governance mechanisms, the possibility to maintain optimal climatic conditions, and
71. See supra text accompanying note 19.
72. FLYVBJERG, supra note 63; Gardiner, supra note 5; EDWARD W. MERROW ET AL., A REVIEW OF COST
ESTIMATION IN NEW TECHNOLOGIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY PROCESS PLANTS (1979); Victor, supranote

26.
73. See generally Gardiner,supra note 5; Victor, supranote 26.
74. Lenton & Vaughan, supra note 1, at 5556.
75. Keith, supra note 4, at 495-96; Barrett, supra note 20, at 49; Carlin, supra note 1, at 1490.
76. STERN, supra note 20.
77. Barker & Bashmakov, supra note 20.
78. Ottmar Edenhofer et al., Mitigation Strategiesand Costs of Climate Protection: The Effects of ETC in
the Hybrid Model MIND, ENERGY J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 207 (2006).
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perhaps, ultimately, to prevent or contain many natural disasters. Whether or not this
picture is attractive to all, geoengineering is equally a path that entails long-term, socioeconomic consequences, which perhaps make its up-front costs rather a sideshow.
Thus the long-term economic comparison between mitigation and geoengineering
is a difficult one, with no clear winner. It may even be pointless. The two are not
necessarily alternatives to each other, not least because carbon fuel resources are limited,
so that alternative energy technology will probably be part of the future quite aside from
the climatic imperative.
The comparison between the direct costs of SRM and conventional mitigation
becomes, therefore, more central. This comparison cannot be properly made yet because
too little is known about the side effects of SRM and there is too little certainty on the
costs of conventional mitigation. However, it is worth noting that it is quite possible - if
Stem and the Royal Society are right - that SRM is orders of magnitude cheaper than
emissions reduction and that there is a difference of some hundreds of billions of dollars
per year.
If so, this has to be taken seriously. The cost difference is not conclusive in any
risk-benefit analysis, because SRM might have side effects which would make such a
price look trivial, but these sums are of an order which could make a significant impact
on world hunger, combating disease, or the availability of universal education, for
example. It would take a rather insular rich-world perspective to consider these
unimportant considerations in making a choice between reducing carbon fuel use and
putting sulphur in the stratosphere. Even some side effects of SRM might be worth
tolerating. How much acid rain is ending hunger worth?
Governance Consequences
Some forms of geoengineering, in particular SRM, are affordable enough to be
carried out by a single state or even a wealthy individual or corporation.7
Geoengineering is also, however, something that would seem to naturally call for
international systems of governance and control.80 Both possibilities raise risks. 8 1
The unilateral exercise of geoengineering is something that might come about as a
result of frustration with failure to avoid climate change by other means or in an attempt
to avoid emissions reductions. It might be pursued by a state who is particularly suffering
from warming or by a state that is particularly under fire for its contribution to warming
and wants to disarm that criticism by taking other measures.82 It might also be
undertaken by groups of states, rather than single ones, a possibility that is perhaps more
likely. If sufficient, or sufficiently powerful, states agree that geoengineering is

79. Davies, supra note 69; Victor, supra note 26, at 329-30; Virgoe, supranote 3, at 116.
80. Davies, supra note 69; Victor, supra note 26, at 329-30; Virgoe, supranote 3, at 116.
81. Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Unilateral State Action in Preventing InternationalEnvironmental
Injury, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 86 (1981); Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International
Governance: A Coming Challenge for InternationalEnvironmentalLaw?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 598 (1999);
Daniel Bodansky, What's So Bad About UnilateralAction to Protect the Environment?, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L.
339, 346 (2000); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Unilateralism and Environmental Protection: Issues of
Perceptionand Reality of Issues, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 315, 332 (2000).
82. Parson, supranote 43, at 13.
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advantageous, they may decide to override the objections of others.
The immediate problems of tortious liability for side effects and regional variations
in effect are obvious and fundamentally similar to liability for causing climate change by
CO 2 emission. It has been pointed out that, in either case, establishing causation may be
very difficult.83 While trends may be attributed to changing temperatures, it is not
always easy to show that a particular event, such as a hurricane or flood, is sufficiently
causally related to another atmospheric event or change.
However, the scale of the effects of geoengineering is such that tortuous liability
may be somewhat beside the point. The greater threat from unilateral action is of conflict
between states, either directly caused by what is perceived to be hostile and harmful
action or indirectly caused by the effects of the resulting climate change.84 For example,
local variation may cause regional precipitation reduction or ocean current changes
which may lead to famine, poverty, and/or migration - all the classic ingredients for
transnational problems and conflict. There seems little doubt that large-scale climate
intervention can be dangerously destabilizing.
On a more conceptual level one may ask how the world should react to states or
individuals who actually prefer warmer temperatures. It has been suggested that Canada
and Russia, with their vast frozen hinterlands, have much to gain from global warming.
This is no doubt very much open to debate, but would it be open to them in principle to
challenge artificial cooling of the earth to pre-global-warming temperatures on the
grounds that this cooling is causing loss of fertile land and harming their interests? Most
geoengineering envisages a change from the status quo and so can be presented by
victims as a harmful act, however fragile, temporary, and unnatural that status quo in fact
is.
There is an understandable consensus that unilateral geoengineering is a potentially
frightening scenario and that such decisions should be made, if at all, in the context of
agreed multilateral mechanisms. Yet the need for these is often seen as an undesirable
side effect in itself.86 As was discussed above, SRM cannot just be stopped once started
and will create its own problems, so that the necessary climate governance institutions
will acquire a life and momentum of their own, with all the usual democratic and
functional problems associated with international institutions of this type.87 Is this a road
we want to go down? Is it desirable that any body, however expert or multilateral, should
have its hand on the global thermostat, wielding thereby a power beyond comparison
with almost any other - perhaps only possession of a nuclear arsenal is comparable, if
less practically usable - and certainly beyond that ever wielded by institutions beyond

83. Michael G. Faure & Andr6 Nollkaemper, International Liability as an Instrument to Prevent and
Compensatefor Climate Change, 26A STAN. J. INT'L L. 123, 157 (2007); David A. Grossman, Warming Up to
a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 22 (2003); Robock
et al., supra note 26, at 531.
84. Gardiner, supra note 5, at 298; Schneider, supra note 1, at 3846; Victor, supra note 26, at 324.
85. Schneider, supra note 1, at 3846; Victor, supra note 26, at 325; Virgoe, supra note 3, at 112.
86. Victor, supra note 26, at 325.
87. Id. Cf Thomas C. Schelling, The Economic Diplomacy of Geoengineering, 33 CLIMATIC CHANGE 303
(1996) (arguing that the governance issues surrounding geoengineering are not novel or particularly
problematic but merely cost and burden allocation questions, with which the international community is
familiar from its many collective ventures).
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the state?
These questions are real and need consideration. However, they are only half the
story, and there is a notable absence in the literature of the other half. This half suggests
that creating global climate governance institutions is not a necessary price but an
actively good thing. It is an extra bonus of geoengineering, not a cost.
Such institutions amount to an acceptance of responsibility for human actions.
Aside from global warming, humankind has the capacity to change and to harm the earth
in various ways, and preventing such harm inevitably requires transnational action.
Environmental issues are often held up as examples of where national borders are more
of a help than a hindrance and where only global thinking makes sense. There is at least
a good argument that the lack of a global environmental governance system is a rather
frightening absence and that, from a strategic environmental point of view, any action
which can help generate such institutions is to be welcomed, at least on these grounds.
From this point of view, the fact that SRM entails a long-term commitment, and that all
but the most suicidal state will recognize that once begun they cannot simply walk away,
is an added strength. A decision to start SRM forces states to commit to collective longterm responsibility for sustaining the global environment. There may be other downsides,
but that in itself looks rather like a plus.
What is urgently needed is political analysis of the dynamics of this process. What
are the chances of unilateral action and the kinds of reactions which may be generated?
What are the possibilities for multilateral cooperation, and how likely is it that this will
lead to deep and responsible governance, or rather to dysfunctional stasis or the crushing
of minority voices? Internationalising any issue brings possible benefits and risks, and
there seems to be no safe default position here. The current state of law and governance
is no guarantor of responsible environmental management. We are forced to try and
assess the risks and benefits of the various possible paths.
Social Consequences
The way that geoengineering in particular may contribute to social change, values,
and identity is likely to be complex. However, it is suggested that two risks stand out,
and these risks are greatest precisely if geoengineering is effective and successful. One is
that by making it okay to bum carbon fuels, and to have burned carbon fuels, we
effectively let intensive carbon fuel users off the hook. Not only does this raise moral
issues of punishment and responsibility but one wonders whether it sends a message to
environmental wrongdoers which we may one day regret. 88 The other related risk is that
we give a great boost to consumerism and an exploitative mentality, fueling a technotrusting, gung-ho approach to the earth.89 That might work this time, but will it always
work? The arguments for avoiding harm, rather than remedying it, are broader than the
specific context of climate change.
The first of these risks can be summarized by saying that the big downside of
88. See Dale Jamieson, Ethics and Intentional Climate Change, 33 CLIMATIC CHANGE 323 (1996); Jay
Michaelson, Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project, 17 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 73, 132-34 (1998).
See also Gardiner,supra note 5, at 295; Schneider, supra note 1, at 3847.
89. Corner & Pidgeon, supra note 66.
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geoengineering is that it lets the bad guys get away with it. Those who burned too much
without caring and ignored the claims that they were destroying the planet can turn round
and say: ey, it turned out okay didn't it? What was all the fuss about?
The most immediate objection to this may be moral. In most criminal law systems,
attempted murder is punished as seriously, or almost as seriously, as actual murder. If
ignoring climate change and wasting carbon fuels is wrong because on current best
evidence it is dangerous for the planet, then such action becomes no less wrong because
the planet turns out to have been savable by other means, unless those burning the fuel
knew or reasonably suspected that this would be the case. Will they claim that? Will they
say that they always had faith that a solution would be found? Perhaps so, but the claim
will have a distinct air of opportunism. Thus it does seem likely that a considerable
group of people who are currently showing behaviour which may be argued to be
wrongful, even despicable, will "get away with it."
This will be distressing for some, but may also raise concrete social risks: these
people were prepared to destroy the earth for their own short-term interests. Is it really
safe to rehabilitate them? What will they do next? There may be an analogy drawn with
releasing an attempted murderer on the grounds that the attempt failed, although the
weakness in the analogy is that the motives and sensibility of those overusing carbon
fuels are far more complex and in many cases rest on incomplete information, genuinely
different perspectives, and local social norms as much as on a thought-through choice for
narrow self-interest at the expense of others. It may be unfair to characterize them as
quasi-criminal, but, on the other hand, in some cases it may not.
A particularly painful aspect of this arises for those who link environmental causes
with other political issues, notably social justice or anti-capitalism. Many
environmentally committed people consider that protecting the environment is
inexorably bound up with matters such as north-south justice, the dominance of trade and
market values over other values, the capitalist economic system, patriarchy, materialism,
and no doubt other things too. Destructive behaviour, on this view, is not to be viewed in
isolation but to be seen in context and related to its diverse causes. The threat to this
world view comes because geoengineering, if successful, threatens to divorce the most
important single environmental issue from this matrix. 90 The climate would have been
threatened by the capitalist, oil-burning status quo, and then rescued by it too, or at least
the threat would have gone away. There seems little doubt that a certain amount of
resistance to geoengineering comes from this perspective, and is fueled by a political
reluctance to concede that there might be a technical solution and that broader social and
economic change might be, at least for this issue, an irrelevance. 9 1 The loss of climate
change as a very large stick with which to beat the establishment and as powerful
evidence for the failure and corruption of that establishment, would certainly be a
political setback for various groups, as well as a great gain for those with a vested
interest in carbon, technology, and the status quo. 92
A political resistance to geoengineering is perhaps at its most convincing if one
90. Lal, supra note 4; Michaelson, supra note 88, at 135; Virgoe, supra note 3, at 105.
91. Corner & Pidgeon, supra note 66; Lal, supra note 4, at 520.
92. Corner & Pidgeon, supra note 66; Lal, supra note 4, at 520.
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thinks long term. It may be, hard though it is to imagine, that partly thanks to SRM (or
other approaches) global warming will go the way of the ozone layer and smog and be
solved by primarily technical interventions, becoming a historical issue even within
decades. The question is what conclusion we should draw from this. Will we have had a
warning and a lucky escape, and, having learned a lesson, will we rush to gratefully
change our distinctly overconsuming ways to prevent being brought to the brink of
disaster again over some other issue - the seas perhaps, or biodiversity? Or will most
people conclude that environmental issues are always solvable by science, that there is
no conflict between consumption and sustainability, and that we should get on and enjoy
our lives and leave policy makers and their technocrats to deal with the consequences?
Geoengineering could lead to a more complacent world, and by turning the threat of
climate doom into an unrealized cry of wolf turn us into easy prey for future real
environmental wolves which may cross our path. It would be an irony if saving the
planet from warming paved the way for ecological doom to come. If SRM were to work
in an acceptable way it would initially appear, given the threats and costs of alternatives,
to be a dramatic stroke of good fortune. But how much do we trust ourselves to remain
responsible in the face of such luck?
CONCLUSION
The global climate is at risk but so too is its economy and the living standards of
its population. We may devastate all three or find ways of keeping them all healthy. The
basic toolbox consists of geoengineering, CO 2 emission reduction, and carbon fuels,
which all offer something good and something bad, costs and benefits. The challenge is
to find which combination of these tools takes us in which direction, and the only thing
which can be concluded with certainty on the basis of existing literature is that not all the
information is in. We could eliminate geoengineering a prioriand make decision making
easier, but it would not be better policy. The risks and benefits which our actions and
inactions entail are rather too large to make ad hoc decisions not founded on research.
SRM in particular offers exciting possibilities for guilt-free carbon. Those possibilities
may come to nothing, as so many exciting early research results do, but it is very hard to
accept the conclusion that they should not be explored.
Such exploration might make geoengineering look attractive in two kinds of
circumstances. One is where there is a failure to control emissions, and climate
catastrophe looms. Here geoengineering may be a tool of last resort, a little scary, but
nevertheless preferable to excessive global warming. This view is common in the
literature. The other, more controversial, scenario is where risk-benefit analysis reveals
geoengineering to be preferable, at least to some extent, to emissions reductions, because
it offers lower costs at acceptable risk. Whether we can evaluate if this is the case
depends on the extent to which these risks can be understood, but, most importantly, it
also depends on an honest analysis of the costs of emissions reduction. If these are
examined in terms of their impact on quality of life for the inhabitants of the planet, then
the policy balancing process will become less banal, more complicated, but more
worthwhile. Public authorities manipulate and regulate many aspects of public space; for
example, via criminal law, social policy, and public health policy. The climate may
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ultimately be just another addition to the repertoire of phenomena that are managed and
controlled in the name of the collective good.
The heart of the resistance to geoengineering, however, is fear of the unknown. It
may have consequences outside our models and beyond our nightmares. It is portrayed
as an irresponsible gamble. Yet so too is burning carbon fuels, and so too would be
declaring geoengineering taboo and deferring policy engagement or serious research.
That would be a gamble that we will reduce emissions on time or that we can, if
necessary, develop SRM in a hurry. These seem forms of blind optimism as cavalier and
as dangerous as any which a cautious excitement about SRM entails.
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